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1995 1996 1997
GDP, chained 1992 dollars 2.0% 2.1% 2.0%
Personal consumption expenditures 2.4% 2.5% 2.1%
Business fixed investment 6.1% 5.5% 3.4%
Residential construction –2.3% 0.8% 0.7%
Change in business inventories ($ bil.) $33.7 $19.0 $24.8
Net exports of goods and services ($ bil.) –$114.2 –$111.5 –$104.5
Government purchases of goods
and services 0.1% 0.2% 0.5%
Industrial production 3.3% 2.2% 2.4%
Car & light truck sales (millions—
calendar year including imports) 14.7 14.8 14.6
Inflation rate (consumer price index) 2.8% 2.9% 2.9%
1. Actual 1995 and mean forecasts of GDP and related items The U.S. auto outlook—
A global perspective
At the end of 1995, light vehicle sales
were forecast to remain in the doldrums
after finishing a disappointing year.
Sales last year had been expected to
increase by 300,000 to 600,000 units
over 1994’s sales, but finished at only
14.7 million units—400,000 units below
the previous year’s level.  The failure
to achieve those early expectations
for 1995 set off an inventory correc-
tion that hampered the entire econo-
my for most of the year.
As the new year began, little had changed
in the fundamentals underlying the
economy, offering few hopes for im-
provement in the auto market.  The
general outlook for light vehicle sales
in 1996 started the year at 14.8 million
units.  However, as much as the first
half of 1995 was a disappointment, the
first half of 1996 has been quite strong.
Sales through June averaged a season-
ally adjusted annualized rate of 15.2
million units, with sales in some months
reaching nearly 16 million units.  How-
ever, sales from month to month have
been so volatile that identifying an
underlying trend has been difficult.
On June 7, 1996, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago held its third annual
Auto Outlook Symposium to discuss
the prospects for auto sales in the
second half of 1996 and in 1997.
This Chicago Fed Letter summarizes
the consensus outlook for auto sales
from the symposium and looks at
how the auto industry and its suppli-
ers are adjusting to increasing global
competition.
Consensus outlook for the economy
The economy in the first half of 1996
has proven to be somewhat stronger
than suggested by the moderate growth
projected for the year as a whole (see
figure 1).  Although real gross domestic
product (GDP) in the first quarter
grew by only 2.2%, it is anticipated to
surge well in excess of 3% in the sec-
ond quarter.  In other words, the first
half of the year should average a full
percentage point more growth than
expected for the year as a whole.  For
the year to average only 2.1% growth,
as suggested by the consensus out-
look, the economy would have to slow
to a pace comparable to the weak first
half of 1995—without the technical
problems of an inventory correction
that shaped the 1995 economy.
Inflation is expected to be relatively
stable at just under 3%, which is actu-
ally higher than the rate of increase
in new car prices over the last year.
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2. Change in light vehicle sales versus change in real GDP
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N. American produced Total sold
3. U.S. vehicle sales by Toyota
Source: Toyota Motor Corporation, presentation at “Auto Outlook
Symposium,” June 7, 1996.
relative price increases of most new
vehicles have been flat to declining
during one of the strongest sales peri-
ods of the current economic expan-
sion.  Given the macroeconomic setting
implied by the consensus outlook for
the second half of 1996, what are the
prospects for auto sales for the rest of
this year and next year?
Implications for auto sales
A rule of thumb in assessing the strength
of the auto market over the last 30
years has been that annual light vehi-
cle sales have never grown when real
GDP has grown less than 2% (see
figure 2).  Moreover, with the notable
exception of 1995, the only time auto
sales have declined when GDP has
grown between 2% and 3.5% has been
right before or after a recession year
(see area between dashed lines in
figure 2).1 Thus, with the economy in
1996 expected to grow 2.1%, light
vehicle sales should be expected to
increase from their 1995 level of 14.7
million units.  Indeed, the consensus
forecast at the symposium was for sales
of 14.8 million units in 1996 and (with
GDP growth slowing to 2%) 14.6 mil-
lion units in 1997.  The forecasts were
submitted before the strength of May
sales was known, when year-to-date sales
were averaging only 15.0 million units.
The Big 3 automakers (General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler), which may have
had better insight into May’s sales pace,
were a bit more optimistic, with 1996
sales forecasts between 15.0 million
and 15.2 million units.
Supporting the Big
3’s optimism have
been light vehicle sales
through the first half
of the year—15.2 mil-
lion units in both the
first and second quar-
ters.  That translates
into a gain of 3% in
auto sales, which is
consistent with 3%
growth in the econo-
my in the first half
of 1996.  Indeed, to
achieve the consen-
sus auto forecast for
1996 of only 14.8 mil-
lion units, sales would
have to average 14.5
million units over the second half of
the year.  That drop (of 4.6%) would
not be out of line with the relatively
anemic 1% GDP growth implied by
the consensus forecast for the second
half of the year.  If the economy were
to average 2.5% growth over the year
rather than the consensus forecast of
2.1%, real GDP growth in the second
half of 1996 would average about 2%.
Maintaining the first half’s pace would
then seem more reasonable.  However,
since the economy in 1996 and 1997 is
expected to be growing in that transi-
tion range of 2% to 3.5%, where auto
sales could fall if the economy were at
or near a peak, one has to take a closer
look at the arguments made at the
symposium to support the consensus
forecast for lower sales in the second
half of the year.
In addition to a moderately paced
economy in the first half of the year,
the symposium highlighted a number
of factors that could boost auto sales.
For one, mortgage refinancing spiked
at the end of last year and beginning
of this year.  While this refinancing
trend was minor compared to the refi-
nancing booms of 1992 and 1993, some
of the improvement in auto sales prob-
ably resulted from lower mortgage
payments freeing up cash flow for con-
sumers to spend on big-ticket items.
Another factor was incentives, which
were being boosted at the end of 1995
to clear out excess inventory, providing
an advantageous price environment.
Finally, a modest but steady decline
in auto loan rates, from a high of
almost 12% in April of last year to
9.6% in April of this year, led to lower
monthly payments.
However, factors that helped auto
sales in the first half of 1996 are likely
to reverse in the second half.  For
example, incentives are expected to
be pulled back now that inventories
are lean again.  Furthermore, long-
term interest rates have begun to rise
and could spill over into auto loan
rates in the months ahead, leading to
higher monthly payments.  In addition,
the rise in long-term interest rates
shuts off any potential boost to sales
from further refinancing activity.
Whether these factors are sufficient
to reduce sales to a 14.5 million unit
pace is far from certain, but the possi-
bility of a second-half slowdown can
not be dismissed simply because sales
in the first half were relatively robust.
However, the economy is offering scant
evidence that a second half slowdown
will turn into a cyclical peak for this
expansion, suggesting that any slowdown
in auto sales would be relatively mild.
Foreign competition in the U.S.
While analysts expect vehicle sales to
be relatively flat over the forecast
horizon, they believe the mix of sales
will continue to shift away from im-
ports.  This shift has been underway
throughout the current expansion.
The strong dollar in the mid-1980s
and an aggressive sales effort by Japa-
nese producers led to an increase in
sales of imported cars to over 3 mil-
lion units per year, roughly 30% of
total car sales between 1986 and 1988.
However, by 1995 the dollar had fall-
en to about ¥100 from a high of ¥250
in 1985, and was one factor contribut-
ing to car import sales falling to 1.5
million units.  In the second quarter
of 1996, car import sales were running
at a 1.3 million unit pace.
The decline in imports has not meant
a decline in foreign competition.
Foreign producers have steadily been
following a deliberate policy (indepen-
dent of the yen) of increasing produc-
tion in the U.S., often with the intent
of exporting back to their home mar-
kets (see figure 3).  For example,
Toyota’s share of U.S. sales coming
from its North American plants went










4. Historic industry model
*Number of firms worldwide.
Source: University of Michigan, Office for the Study
of Automotive Transportation, presentation at “Auto
Outlook Symposium,” June 7, 1996.
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Toyota is expected to increase its pur-
chases from U.S. suppliers to $6.45
billion from $2.6 billion in 1990.
U.S. auto suppliers have to meet global
standards of quality to achieve core-
supplier status with primary automak-
ers.  Beyond investing in more efficient
capital, domestic suppliers have increas-
ingly been seeking cost reductions
through economies of scale that merg-
ing with competitors can provide.  The
perception among many suppliers is
that to become a core supplier to a
global automaker, the supplier must
surpass a threshold of $1 billion in
annual revenues.  In 1995, there were
over 130 mergers in the auto supplier
base.  In the first four months of 1996,
over 50 mergers were announced.  In
addition, suppliers are expected to take
greater responsibility for project man-
agement and parts development,
rather than simply producing from
blueprints for the original equipment
manufacturer (OEM).  The suppliers
benefit from consolidation not only
by reducing costs but by capturing
more of the value added (ultimately
profits) in the process of producing
a vehicle.
The requirements for becoming a
global-class supplier are leading to
dramatic changes in the structure of
the supplier industry, which can only
be met by well-capitalized suppliers.
There are currently about 2,500 first-tier
auto suppliers worldwide (see figure 4).
In addition, there are about 280,000
second- and third-tier suppliers.  By
the end of this decade, the number
of first-tier suppliers is expected to
be cut in half.  In the short term, the
results are likely to be lower produc-
tion costs for automakers and lower
prices for consumers.  In the long
run, the risk is that the concentration
of suppliers will increase their lever-
age on automakers, which may have
fewer options for finding alternative
suppliers.  (Witness the March brake
plant strike that shut down General
Motors.)  This could ease the pressure
on suppliers to cut costs, reducing auto-
makers’ ability to cut prices.  Ideally,
competitive pressures should be bal-
anced in such a way that the auto and
supplier industries can remain profit-
able, while price increases can continue
to be constrained.
increase of over 260,000 cars—rough-
ly the production of one assembly
plant.  Toyota, which has nine auto
facilities in North America and is build-
ing its third auto assembly plant (to be
located in southern Indiana), sold 1.06
million cars in the U.S. in 1990 and 1.08
million in 1995.  In addition, Toyota
increased exports out of its North Amer-
ican facilities from 19,000 in 1990 to
68,000 in 1995 (over half going to Ja-
pan).  If the dollar continues its recent
pattern of strengthening, those exports
could be redirected to the U.S. market.
Perhaps with this in mind, Toyota’s
third assembly plant will be designed to
produce light trucks—a market that has
been difficult for foreign producers to
enter because of stiff import tariffs on
light trucks.
Restructuring among suppliers
The increase in foreign competition
has had a profound impact on auto
suppliers, as well as auto producers.
Fierce competition from European
and Asian producers has forced Big 3
producers to seek continuous cost
reductions from their major suppliers.
Initially, as foreign auto producers
began to establish plants in the U.S.,
they tended to import parts from their
established suppliers.  Many of these
suppliers located plants in the U.S.,
which increased the competitive pres-
sures on domestic auto suppliers.  As
the dollar weakened and political
pressures built, however, foreign auto
producers began increasingly to pur-
chase parts from domestically owned
auto suppliers.  For example, in 1996,
Concluding remarks
Trend growth in light vehicle sales has
been slowing for some time, and com-
petition for future market share is
certain to be intense.  Sales in 1996
and 1997 are expected to be only
slightly above trend level.  In order to
become more profitable, automakers
have little choice but to lower their
costs.  In the process, they are reshap-
ing not only their industry but also
the entire supplier network.  To date,
these changes have helped to con-
strain the rise of new vehicle prices.
As consolidation in the auto supplier
industry advances, however, and the
number of suppliers becomes more
limited, the ability of automakers to
push costs down may diminish along
with their ability to constrain their
own prices.
—Robert H. Schnorbus
Assistant vice president and
senior economist
1The years 1966 and 1967 were considered
growth–recession years.  The economy was
not growing fast enough to absorb increas-
es in the labor force, creating conditions in
the auto market similar to periods when





























































































































































































































Sources: The Midwest Manufacturing Index (MMI) is
a composite index of 16 industries, based on monthly
hours worked and kilowatt hours.   IP represents the
Federal Reserve Board’s industrial production
index for the U.S. manufacturing sector.  Autos
and light trucks are measured in annualized units,
using seasonal adjustments developed by the Board.
The purchasing managers’ survey data for the
Midwest are weighted averages of the seasonally
adjusted production components from the Chicago,
Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing Managers’
Association surveys, with assistance from Bishop










(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
June Month ago Year ago
Cars 6.6 6.4 6.1




May Month ago Year ago
MMI 147.7 146.6 141.1
123.2 126.5 127.2 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
June Month ago Year ago
MW 60.7 62.0 52.4
45.7 52.6 55.4 U.S.
1994
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Midwest manufacturing activity increased 1.1% in May, versus 0.7% in the nation,
as the region continued to rebound from the GM strike-induced dip in March.
Year to date, however, the Midwest has also fared better than the nation, suggest-
ing that recent gains were not all related to the strike’s impact.  The MMI was
up 2.5% from its December level, while the IP was up only 1.9%.  Still, the auto
industry has been a key factor in both measures of activity, with auto assemblies
in the second quarter rising at an annualized rate of over 50%.
Midwest purchasing managers’ indexes in June generally signaled solid expan-
sion in production over May levels, although the drop in the composite index to
60.7 suggested some slowing in that expansion.  The production component of
the national purchasing managers’ survey jumped nearly 3 points to 55.4 in
June, its highest level in over a year.